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Abstract
We respond to Sornette and Johansen’s criticisms of our findings re-
garding log-periodic precursors to financial crashes. Included in this
paper are discussions of the Sornette-Johansen theoretical paradigm, tra-
ditional methods of identifying log-periodic precursors, the behavior of
the first differences of a log-periodic price series, and the distribution of
drawdowns for a securities price.
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In Ref. [1], we reconsidered the evidence regarding log-periodic pre-
cursors to financial crashes. We focused much of our attention on the work
of Didier Sornette and Anders Johansen [2]- [4], and they have written a de-
tailed response [5] to our paper. We now take this opportunity to rebut their
criticisms.
We made four points in [1]. First, we had some comments regarding the
theory proposed by Johansen et al in [4]. Second, we reviewed the traditional
curve-fitting approach for identifying log-periodicity and noted some problems
with this methodology. Third and most important, we tested a prediction that
comes out of the model in [4] that, in addition to the price series, the first
differences of the price series should also behave log-periodically within a log-
periodic precursor. In examining the first differences for the S&P 500 during
the log-periodic spell leading up to the famous October 1987 crash, we found
that, if we restricted attention to the years 1980-1986 (which covers the bulk of
this spell but not the last year prior to the crash), the log-periodic component
of the Sornette-Johansen specification was not statistically significant at the
5% level. Finally, we weighed in on Johansen and Sornette’s claim [2] that
large events like the 87 crash are outliers in the distribution of drawdowns, a
drawdown being the cumulative drop in an index from a local maximum to the
ensuing local minimum. We will address Sornette and Johansen’s response to
each of these four points separately.
1 The Sornette-Johansen Paradigm
The economic theory proposed by Sornette and Johansen (SJ) to explain
the incidence of log-periodicity in securities prices is described in [4] and summa-
rized in Section 2 of our own paper [1]. Their model assumes that log-periodicity
arises from the interaction of a large group of irrational agents who reside on
a network with discrete scale invariance. They also include in their model a
single rational agent who is risk neutral and has rational expectations. The
introduction of this agent served two purposes. It was intended to defuse the
criticism that a log-periodic bubble could be exploited by rational agents to
make unbounded profits. In addition, the no-arbitrage condition derived from
this agent’s preferences supplies a mathematical link between the price of the
security and the probability of a crash induced by the irrational agents.
In their model, they consider a security which earns no dividends, so
any positive price would signify a bubble in the security price p(t). The price
can be described in the notation of stochastic calculus as following the process
dp
p(t)
= µ(t)dt+ ε(t)− λdj, (1)
where µ(t) is a time-dependent drift and ε(t) is a mean-zero noise term. The
binary variable j(t) keeps track of the impending crash. It will equal zero before
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a crash and one afterwards, so dj will vanish except at the instant of the crash,
at which time the price of the security will fall by the factor λ. (A more general
model would have λ be the mean of a distribution of possible crash sizes.) The
no-arbitrage condition is then a martingale condition on the price:
E[dp] = 0. (2)
One observation made in [1], which was also made by Ilinski [6], is that
such a no-arbitrage condition precludes the possibility of making positive profits
with certainty. That is why it is called a no-arbitrage condition. At this point,
it is important to note that what an economist means when using the term
profit differs from what an accountant or the typical layperson would mean.
Economic profit is the surplus of revenue over opportunity cost, opportunity
cost being the stream of income that is lost because one did not allocate the
resources in question to some other purpose. In this context, the opportunity
cost will be the income lost because one did not invest one’s resources in the
best possible alternative manner. When we say that the no-arbitrage condition
precludes the possibility of making a certain, positive profit, we do not mean
that investors can earn no revenue from trading in this security. Rather, we
mean that an agent cannot improve on a strategy which earns zero expected
return.
In [5], SJ argue incorrectly that, in fact, positive profits could be earned
by a savvy investor in their model. They make a distinction between average
returns and conditional returns. The no-arbitrage condition (2) requires that
the average unconditional return be zero. However, the return conditional on no
crash having occurred, represented by µ(t), can and generally will be nonzero.
This is true, but they are missing the point. Investors are not interested
in conditional returns. They cannot depend on a crash not happening. If they
could simply ignore the possibility of a crash, there would be no bubble. So
yes, it is possible that, after the fact, an investor might find he has earned
some money by trading in this security. However, before the fact, he will
have just as much expectation that he might lose that same amount. There
is no way to construct a trading strategy that will exploit this bubble to earn
an expected return greater than zero. That is the upshot of the no-arbitrage
condition. If one is going to presume that the Sornette-Johansen paradigm
is valid–keeping in mind we do not advocate that presumption–then it would
be quite irrational to attempt to devise a money-making strategy which uses
log-periodicity to forecast crashes. One might as well spend one’s time seeking
to invent a perpetual motion machine.
As SJ note [5], there is some empirical evidence that the efficient market
hypothesis is false and that it might be possible to earn positive profits relative
to a standard diversification strategy. However, this evidence does not support
their model. On the contrary, it goes against the assumptions of their model.
Another point which Ilinski [6] made that we expanded upon in [1] was
the criticism that SJ’s model is based on the unrealistic assumption that only
a single rational agent exists, who also happens to be risk neutral. In [5], SJ
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make a fair stab at loosening the risk neutrality assumption. They draw upon
a stochastic discount factor (SDF) model in [7] to broaden their results and
conclude that “the most general form of risk aversion does not invalidate our
theory.” As anyone familiar with the literature on expected utility theory should
know, Cochrane’s model, while certainly useful, is by no means an exhaustive
model of risk averse preferences. However, this specification is presumably
general enough to serve the purpose of showing their model can accomodate the
possibility that their single rational agent is risk averse.
Unfortunately for SJ, the multiplicity issue will be much more difficult
to tame. They note in passing [5] that “the SDF is not different from one agent
to the next . . . because it describes the aggregate perception by the rational
agents of the level of risks.” Essentially, SJ are invoking what is known as a
representative-agent model of the macroeconomy. Under certain conditions,
such as complete markets, it can be shown that in equilibrium an economy
of many agents can be replaced by a single imaginary agent, and, indeed, the
stochastic discount factor of all the individual agents would equal the SDF for
this imaginary agent [8].
The problem with this argument is that it is circular reasoning, for
it requires than an equilibrium consistent with the bubble exists. They are
assuming what they are supposed to be proving. One purpose of introducing
the rational agent was to forestall the criticism that a rational agent might
exploit a log-periodic bubble to earn unbounded profits, a situation that could
not occur in equilibrium and has never been observed empirically. Quoting from
Johansen et al in [4], “Lest this sound like voodoo science, let us reassure the
reader that the ability to predict the critical date is perfectly consistent with the
behavior of the rational agents in our model: they all know this date, the crash
may happen anyway, and they are unable to make any abnormal risk-adjusted
profits by using this information.” Thus far, we are not reassured.
It is straightforward to construct a price process consistent with equilib-
rium for one rational agent, but it is considerably more difficult to accomplish
this for two or more rational agents. Allowing an exotic price bubble compounds
the situation further. It is more than likely that very stringent assumptions
would have to be put on agents’ preferences to construct a market equilibrium
with a log-periodic price bubble.
Of course, one could dispense with rationality and no arbitrage, and
then it is trivial to get log-periodicity in price processes as Sornette and Ide
demonstrated in [9]. The trick is to combine all these elements, and so far no
one has accomplished this except under highly unrealistic assumptions.
2 Fitting the Price Curve
The majority of [5] is devoted to attacking the third section of [1] in which
we review past work on identifying log-periodicity. In their words, “We are
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obviously not going to divulge our technique and methodology for crash predic-
tion but instead offer a few common sense guidelines to avoid the rather obvious
traps in which Feigenbaum has fallen.” One could just as well argue that they
are the ones falling into the traps. We see only a marginal role for common
sense in determining their guidelines. Their rules of thumb appear to have been
chosen to produce the results they want to show. They give no econometric
justification for rejecting our own inferences.
The specification that we used in [1] came from [10]. The log of the
price is assumed to obey
ln(p(t)) = A+Bf1(t) + Cf2(t), (3)
where
f1(t) =
(tc − t)
β√
1 +
(
tc−t
∆t
)2β
and
f2(t) = f1(t) cos
[
ω ln(tc − t) +
∆ω
2β
ln
(
1 +
(
tc − t
∆t
)2β)
+ φ
]
.
This is a specification with three linear parameters A, B, and C; and six non-
linear parameters ω, β, ∆t, ∆ω , tc, and φ. We should note that the critical
time tc does not correspond to the time of the crash but, rather, to a time when
the probability of a crash is maximized.
Econometrically, this is an extremely unfriendly model because there
are so many nonlinearities. Furthermore, in the Sornette-Johansen paradigm
this specification is supposed to correspond to an integral of the function µ(t) in
Eq. (1), which would imply that ln p(t) is autocorrelated. As we demonstrated
with a pedagogical example in Section 4 of [1], regressing an autocorrelated time
series on functions of time alone can lead to spurious results, and this kind of
regression is precisely what is being done when one fits a stock index to the
specification (3).
The many curve fits of log-periodic spells existing in the literature are
producing descriptive statistics regarding the realization of price trajectories.
However, these descriptive statistics may offer no information about the struc-
tural parameters of the underlying stochastic process. SJ’s primary objection
[5] to our results in [1] is that we often obtain values for the nonlinear parameters
which are either too large or too small relative to some unspecified standard.
In the absence of any real log-periodic structure in the data, there is no basis for
expecting the nonlinear parameters to satisfy their criteria. If we blindly apply
a complicated regression specification to a data set, we will necessarily obtain
parameter estimates, but these estimates will be meaningless if the specification
is wrong.
SJ put great faith in the values of β and ω that they find in their many
examples of log-periodic spells, and they are quite impressed that they always
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manage to get similar values. However, we do not replicate this result with our
own procedure. For example, our best fit for the 80-87 data set produces very
different values of β and ω from what Johansen et al report in [4]. One possible
explanation for this discrepancy, suggested by their criticism mentioned above,
is that they are constraining their fitting procedure to consider only values of
the nonlinear parameters which fall into a chosen set. If this is what they are
doing, it would generally be considered inappropriate and would cloud the issue
of whether they are actually estimating the population parameters they believe
they are estimating.
Regarding the Lomb periodograms of [3], we erroneously stated in [1]
that this procedure offered an independent means of estimating the frequency
of a log-periodic fit. In fact, the method described in [3] is not independent
from their curve-fitting procedure since they use the fit to determine tc and
to detrend the data. It would be very surprising indeed if they found a low
power at the frequency ω after they have already shown they can fit the data to
an oscillation with frequency ω. Consequently, the consistency of their Lomb
periodograms with their curve fitting does not help to corroborate SJ’s claims.
In [5], SJ also express some outrage regarding our dismissal of previous
statistical analyses carried out by Johansen et al [3]-[4] and by Feigenbaum
and Freund [11]. We stand by our comments from the first paper. With
respect to Monte Carlo simulations, we can only use them to establish statistical
properties of a stochastic process if the data-generating process (DGP) used in
these simulations shares those properties. The fact that simulations produce
behavior different from what we observe in real markets only proves that the
DGP driving these simulations is not the true DGP.
With respect to studies involving fits of out-of-sample data, many of
SJ’s supposed fits are not impressive. Just leafing through the figures in [5],
we find examples where the alleged log-periodic oscillations are dwarfed by the
volatility in the data and it is very hard to believe we are looking at the best fit
to satisfy the specification (3), which may not even be a correct specification.
Financial economists can tell many stories of the folly in putting too much faith
in patterns discovered by poring through out-of-sample data. If log-periodicity
is truly a harbinger of crashes, this is not going to be established with data
mining. Its power as a forecasting tool can only be measured by its ability to
forecast. We must wait to see what the future brings to judge this issue.
That said, SJ do present one interesting new piece of evidence in [5].
They describe the result of a systematic scan of data for the Hang-Seng index
using a moving window of 1.5 years from 1980 to 1999. During this period, they
found 9 examples of log-periodic spells that satisfy their criterion. All but one of
these was followed by a drawdown of 5% or more, a result so good that it should
make one suspicious. This was also a period in which they claim at least eight
(independent) drawdowns of 10% or more occurred. Clearly, the Hang-Seng is
a highly volatile index. The average time between these large drawdowns is
about 2.5 years, about the same order of magnitude of their window size.
Now, of course, SJ would argue that this is great evidence of the power
of log-periodicity to predict crashes. But they give no information about how
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well the estimation of tc using their procedure does at estimating the actual time
of the ensuing crash, and this suggests another mechanism might be at work
here. It is possible that their selection criteria will, with great probability,
rule out time periods in which a large drawdown occurs. If that is the case,
their procedure may simply be flagging periods in which crashes do not occur.
And since crashes are very frequent in this 20-year interval, the time between a
flagged period and the next crash is likely to be short, so it may look like their
procedure is forecasting crashes when it is not really doing that at all.
3 Behavior of First Differences
The most important section of [1], where we made our main original con-
tribution, received the least attention from SJ in [5]. As we already noted in
the previous section, if we assume ln p is following a process of the form (1) then
least squares estimators of the parameters in Eq. (3) can give spurious results
if one regresses ln p directly on functions of time. Instead, the appropriate
procedure is to look at the first differences of ln p. We did this in Section 4
of [1] for the log-periodic spell in the S&P 500 leading up to the October 1987
crash.
As we discussed in the previous paper, the least-squares objective func-
tion for the specification (3) does not have a clearly defined global minimum with
respect to the nonlinear parameters, so it is not clear how one should properly es-
timate the mean and, more importantly, the variance of least-squares estimators
for these nonlinear parameters. We, therefore, focused on the linear parameters
A, B, and C. It is well accepted in the finance literature that the noise-term
ε(t) in (1) is dependent on previous values of ε, which would invalidate standard
error formulas for the estimation of A, B, and C. (SJ [5] insinuate that, because
the distribution of ε is fat-tailed as opposed to Gaussian, least squares methods
are inappropriate for estimation in this context. However, consistent estima-
tion with least squares methods does not require Gaussian noise distributions,
which are by far the exception in econometrics.) To overcome the problem of
serial dependence, we estimated critical values for the T statistics of the linear
parameters using a Monte Carlo simulation. This procedure requires that we
specify a DGP to model the behavior of the S&P 500. We used a random
walk for this purpose. While we do not believe the S&P 500 actually follows a
random walk, we can set the parameters of the random walk to match some of
the properties of the S&P 500, in this case the first two moments.
In [5], SJ make note of an apparent inconsistency here. In [1], we
dismissed their Monte Carlo results because they only considered one possible
DGP for securities prices, a GARCH model. Yet here, we expect them to accept
our own Monte Carlo results which also consider only one DGP.
There is a subtle point of reasoning that SJ evidently missed here. In
their case, they are trying to persuade readers to accept an alternative hypoth-
esis. In contrast, we were testing and rejecting such a hypothesis. As they
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admit, “No truth is ever demonstrated in science; the only thing that can be
done is to construct models and reject them at a given level of statistical sig-
nificance.” In classical statistics, one either rejects a hypothesis or one fails to
reject it. In their case, they rejected the null hypothesis that a GARCH model
could produce the behavior they observed in real markets. If their experiment
had turned out the other way, we would probably not be writing this paper
because people would have concluded there was nothing extraordinary about
log-periodic fits. Instead, the experiment went as they hoped, and we can con-
clude that the actual stochastic process is not a GARCH process. That is all
we can conclude. We cannot draw any conclusions about the validity of log-
periodicity because the space of possible DGPs is huge, and all they ruled out is
an infinitesimal fraction of it. Note also that the fact that the GARCH model
is “one of the most fundamental benchmarks of the industry” is irrelevant. The
GARCH model is a very good model of how stock prices behave under normal
circumstances, but SJ’s own investigations demonstrate how poorly it captures
the behavior of stock prices under the extreme circumstances surrounding a
large drawdown.
In contrast to their rejection of the GARCH, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that a random walk could produce the log-periodic behavior we were
looking at. We can, therefore, conclude that the random walk-like properties
of the true DGP are enough to produce this behavior. It is reasonable to
expect that other DGPs with similar properties can also replicate this behavior.
Whereas SJ have merely eliminated from consideration one out of an infinite
number of possible DGPs, we have established that the observed log-periodic
behavior in first differences is not extraordinary. Thus, the negative result of
our paper speaks much louder than the positive results that they and others
have found.
We tested the specification
∆ ln p(ti) = 0 = A+B∆f1(ti) + C∆f2(ti) +
4∑
s=2
Dsδsi + εi, (4)
where we had closing prices sampled at N dates t1, . . . , tN and εi is a mean-
zero noise term. The covariate δsi is a delta function equal to 1 if ∆ti = s
and 0 otherwise. Note that in the Sornette-Johansen paradigm the constant
A and the time dummy variables D2, D3, and D4 will vanish. One criticism
of SJ’s work is that they have done no specification tests. They assume their
hypothetical specification is the correct one and do not consider the possibility
that an alternative might do better, which would constitute a rejection of their
hypothesis. The inclusion of these extra terms here allows for the possibility
that the upward trend seen in most stock prices leading up to a drawdown
results from a constant drift rather than the more complicated f1 term of their
specification.
For the period from January 1980 to September 1987, we found that B,
the coefficient of ∆f1, was not statistically significant. Thirty percent of our
Monte Carlo simulations produced a T statistic B equal or larger in magnitude
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than what we obtained for our best fit. In [5], SJ dismiss this finding, attributing
the insignificance of f1 to “the intrinsic difficulty in quantifying a trend and an
acceleration in very noisy data.” However, one could invoke similar difficulties
to dismiss the entire field of log-periodic precursors.
For C, the coefficient of the log-periodic term, we found that it was
statistically significant at the 5% level if we considered the whole data set.
However, if we restrict our attention to the period from 1980-1986, twenty-
five percent of our Monte Carlo simulations produced a C equal or larger in
magnitude to the result of the best fit. Thus, we concluded that the log-
periodic component was not statistically significant for the bulk of the log-
periodic spell preceding the 87 crash. In [5], SJ dismiss this result also: “It is
as if a worker on critical phenomena was trying to get a reliable estimation of
tc and β by thrashing the last 15% of the data, which are of course the most
relevant.” This argument presupposes that we are, in fact, looking at a critical
phenomenon, which in our opinion has yet to be established. In any case, that
is beside the point. If it was our purpose to measure nonlinear parameters like
tc and β, then clearly it would be a mistake to throw out the data where the
critical behavior is most pronounced. But that was not our purpose. Our
purpose was to determine whether these functions had a statistically significant
presence throughout the data, and the answer is they do not. Granted, this
does not prove that log-periodicity is absent from the first difference series during
these six years. It only proves we cannot convincingly detect log-periodicity
there. Nevertheless, given this null result, a theory which can explain the log-
periodic behavior in ln p without requiring log-periodic behavior in ∆ ln p will
be preferred over the Sornette-Johansen paradigm by Occam’s Razor.
Before moving on, we must point out that SJ are being hypocritical
when they chastise us for throwing out the last year of data. As we noted in
[1], it is common practice in this literature to throw out from these curve-fitting
procedures the end data points closest to the crash, sometimes eliminating a
period as large as a few months. SJ even confess to this practice in [5]. These
end data points are even closer to the alleged critical point than most of the data
we excluded. If these are the crucial data points, then we have all committed
a great sin.
4 The Frequency Distribution of Drawdowns
The last subject considered in [1] was SJ’s claim, first put forward in [2]
and later elaborated upon in [12], that large events like stock market crashes are
outliers in the frequency distribution of drawdowns. They maintained that all
but the largest drawdowns fit well to an exponential or a stretched exponential
distribution, and they, therefore, posited that a different mechanism must be
producing these outlier events. We responded to this claim by doing a specifi-
cation test on this drawdown distribution, and we found both the exponential
and the stretched exponential specifications could be rejected.
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In [5], SJ answer this challenge with three new pieces of evidence. First,
they describe the results of a bootstrap test. They reshuffled the sample of
daily returns for the NASDAQ composite index from 1971 to 2000 and gen-
erated 10000 days of simulated data. The resulting drawdown distribution
produced a much smaller frequency of large events than is observed in the real
data. However, this is not surprising. They are bootstraping the uncondi-
tional distribution of daily returns, but it is well established that daily returns
are dependent on previous returns, and, in fact, the stock market may even be a
long memory process. All of these dependencies are ignored by this bootstrap
test. We can conclude from this test that these dependencies, indeed, play an
important role in producing large drawdowns, but this does not establish that
large drawdowns are outliers.
Next, they describe the drawdown distribution resulting from Monte
Carlo simulations of the stock market as a GARCH process. This simulated
distribution also differs from the empirical distribution, but again this only
substantiates their result that the true DGP underlying securities prices is not
a GARCH process.
Finally, they corroborate our result that the stretched exponential does
not fit well to moderate drawdowns larger than 5%. But instead of abandoning
the claim that large drawdowns are outliers, they expand the class of drawdowns
that they consider to be outliers. To some extent, we must recognize that this
is an argument over semantics. What do we mean by an outlier?
Moving beyond semantics, we do not agree with SJ’s claim that “the
exponential distribution is the natural null hypothesis for uncorrelated returns.”
In [4], Johansen et al derive the result that the drawdown distribution should
be exponential under the same assumption of their bootstrap test that changes
in a stock price from one instant to the next are independent. This assump-
tion is certainly false, though it may be a reasonable approximation for small
drawdowns. As the length of a chain of similarly signed innovations increases,
however, the serial dependence in this chain will likely become more important.
Thus, while it may be a natural null hypothesis that the distribution should be
exponential in the limit of small drawdown sizes, it is not fair to extrapolate this
hypothesis to large drawdown sizes. Moreover, this weaker null hypothesis that
the distribution be exponential only in the small drawdown limit is supported
by the preponderance of the evidence.
We also quibble with their claim that one could not “prove” that large
drawdowns are outliers. As we discussed in [1], if one could reliably distin-
guish drawdowns with a log-periodic precursor from drawdowns lacking such a
precursor, then one could determine the distribution of these two populations
of drawdowns. If the distributions differ in a statistically significant manner,
that would go a long way to establishing the claim that a different mechanism
is responsible for the two kinds of drawdowns.
5 Concluding Remarks
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Speaking as a researcher who has been involved from the beginning in
the study of log-periodicity in the stock market, we believe that the initial
evidence of crashes as critical phenomena was certainly intriguing. However,
it is important not to get carried away by a new hypothesis and lose one’s
scientific objectivity. SJ lament [5] that “it is an all too common behavior
to dismiss lightly a serious hypothesis by not taking the trouble to learn the
relevant skills necessary to test it rigorously.” However, they themselves have
thrown roadblocks in the way of testing it rigorously. As long as they keep the
details of their methodology secret, their results cannot be independently tested
or reproduced. They have also disregarded many econometric procedures that
would generally be considered the most appropriate tools for addressing the
problems they encounter. Instead, they cobble together methods with little
or no theoretical basis and then they question why nobody follows their trail.
Furthermore, when one finds that standard methods produce results contrary to
their hypothesis, one has to consider if maybe they have rejected these standard
methods precisely because the results obtained do not support their hypothesis.
SJ also draw an analogy between log-periodicity and global warming.
We think a better analogy can be made to the canalis of Mars. For over
a hundred years, astronomers like Giovanni Schiaparelli and Percival Lowell
were almost fanatical in their belief that they could see evidence of a great
Martian civilization through their telescopes. Eventually, telescopic resolutions
improved to the point where astronomers could clearly see there was no system
of artificial canals crisscrossing the surface, yet it took a long time for the idea
to die.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Simon Lee, Gene Savin, Charles Whiteman, and
Robert Wickham for their input. We are also grateful to J. D. Farmer for his
encouragement.
References
[1] Feigenbaum J 2001 Quant. Finance 1 346
[2] Johansen A and Sornette D 1999 Eur. Phys. J. B 1 141
[3] Johansen A, Sornette D and Ledoit O 1999 J. Risk 1 5
[4] Johansen A, Sornette D and Ledoit O 2000 Int. J. Theor. Appl. Finance 3
219
[5] Sornette D and Johansen A 2001 Preprint cond-mat/0106520 (in press at
Quant. Finance)
[6] Ilinski K 1999 Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 10 741
11
[7] Cochrane J H 2001 Asset Pricing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press)
[8] Constantinides G M 1982 J. of Business 55 253.
[9] Sornette D and Ide K 2001 Preprint cond-mat/0106054
[10] Sornette D and Johansen A 1997 Physica A 245 411
[11] Feigenbaum J and Freund P G O 1996 Int. J. Mod. Phys. B 10 3737
[12] Johansen A and Sornette D 2000 Preprint cond-mat/0010050
12
